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In Defense of Specialized Theft Statutes 
DAVID GRAY & CHELSEA JONES  
INTRODUCTION 
tuart Green has done us a great favor in Thirteen Ways to Steal a 
Bicycle1—well, several really—by documenting our current views on 
theft; putting them in historical and philosophical perspective; and 
launching a deep and sophisticated critique of two prominent, and 
somewhat paradoxical, features of contemporary theft law: the 
consolidation of common law theft crimes2 and the proliferation of 
specialized theft statutes.3 As Green points out, the modern trend of theft 
laws in the United States, particularly since the American Law Institute 
adopted Herbert Weschler ’s draft of the Model Penal Code4 in 1962, has 
 
  Associate Professor, University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School of Law.  
  University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School of Law.  
1  STUART P. GREEN, THIRTEEN WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE (2012).  
2  Green describes three major points of criticism that led to a complete overhaul of theft 
law. First, theft law was conceptually too complex and judges, juries, and the public  could not 
grasp the abstract distinctions between offenses. Id. at 17-18. Second, loopholes between 
offenses allowed defendants to escape conviction on technicalities. Id. at 18. Finally, the 
common law distinctions between various theft offenses were thought to serve no legitimate 
purpose. Id.  
3  Despite the consolidation of common law theft offenses, many states expanded theft laws 
by enacting specialized theft statutes. Green notes that the proliferation of “subject-specific” 
theft statutes is the result of the growing complexity of substantive criminal law and does not 
reflect a deliberate attempt by states to reverse the consequences of consolidation. Id. at 34. 
4  Article 223 of the Model Penal Code represented a significant shift in theft law. The 
Model Penal Code collapsed distinct common law theft offenses, such as larceny, 
embezzlement, false pretense, and extortion, into a single theft offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 
223.1 introductory note (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). The purpose behind 
consolidation was 
 to avoid procedural problems . . . [such as] a defendant’s claim that he 
did not misappropriate the property by the means alleged but in fact 
misappropriated the property by some other means and from the 
combination of such a claim with the procedural rule that a defendant 
S 
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been to eschew the sometimes technical distinctions between common law 
crimes like larceny, false pretenses, larceny by trick, embezzlement, 
blackmail, and extortion in favor of consolidated theft statues that frame 
the offense characteristics in general terms and order severity of 
punishment mainly according to the value of goods.5 One problem with 
consolidation, as Green argues, is that it flattens morally important 
distinctions between traditional common law theft offenses, leaving a one-
size-fits-all scheme that fails to account for differences between either the 
method by which a theft is accomplished or the nature of the property 
stolen.6 
Holding goods and value constant, Green contends that there is a 
moral difference between larceny and failing to return misdelivered 
property, say, whether one favors a retributivist or consequentialist theory 
of punishment.7  Furthermore, as Green’s original empirical study shows,8 
these distinctions are reflected in commonly held intuitions about the 
relative blameworthiness of various theft strategies.9 Separately, Green 
makes the case for treating the theft of different kinds of property 
differently, based principally on the nature of property rights affected.10  
Thus, sneaking into a full hall to hear a lecture without paying while others 
wait outside unable to get in is morally distinct from sneaking into a half-
filled hall.11 That is because taking a seat in the full hall excludes a potential 
paying customer, thereby denying the speaker income he or she otherwise 
would have had. By contrast, sneaking into the half-filled lecture hall 
denies the speaker very little in that the speaker receives the same 
 
who is charged with one offense cannot be convicted by proving another.  
Id. § 223.1(b). 
5  GREEN, supra note 1, at 23-24. 
6  Id. at 30-31. 
7  See id. at 169-71.  
8  We discuss Professor Green’s study and its implications below. See infra  Part III. 
9  As the title of the book suggests, Green identifies thirteen main categories of theft 
conduct: Receiving stolen property, failing to return misdelivered property, false pretenses, 
passing a bad check, looting, embezzlement, larceny, blackmail, robbery, theft by 
housebreaking, extortion, and armed robbery. GREEN, supra  note 1, at 60-61. To provide some 
context for his moral analysis, Green conducted an empirical study in which he asked 
participants to assess the comparative seriousness of thefts conducted using each of these 
means. Id. at 57-58, 60-62. In order from most to least serious, his respondents generally 
agreed on the following list: (1) Armed Robbery; (2) Extortion; (3) Theft by Housebreaking; (4) 
S imple Robbery; (5) Blackmail; (6) Larceny; (7) Embezzlement; (8) Looting; (9) Passing a Bad 
Check; (10) False Pretenses; (11) Failing to Return Misdelivered Property; and (12) Receiving 
Stolen Property. Id. at 62.  
10  See id. at 6, 75. 
11  Id. at 67-68. 
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compensation from paying attendees that he or she otherwise would have 
because the “thief’s” conduct does not exclude another paying audience 
member from attending.12 Here again, Green’s empirical study supports his 
moral views.13 Green therefore argues for abandoning the project of theft 
consolidation in favor of adopting statutory structures that give full weight 
to differences in the manner of theft, the type of property stolen, and the 
nature and degree of both primary interference with property interests and 
any secondary harms.14 
Principally, because he is so clear in developing his critique of 
consolidation, and so comprehensive and persuasive in assembling the 
constituents of his normative framework for  defining and grading theft 
offenses,15 there are many opportunities to quibble with Professor Green 
but very little ground for serious disagreement. It is therefore in a spirit of 
broad agreement that we will focus our attention here on what we take to 
be a paradox of sorts in Professor Green’s intuitions, if not his argument. 
Specifically, as Green notes, there is an odd tension in the recent history of 
theft law in that an increase in specialized theft laws has accompanied 
consolidation.16 Green is of course strongly critical of consolidation, but is 
also skeptical of many specialized theft statutes.17 His skepticism seems to 
 
12  As Green explains, zero-sumness involves a “transfer of property from owner to 
offender.” Id. at 210. In other words, “what the thief gains, the victim must lose.” Id. Green 
also points out, whether, and to what degree, a good is commodifiable and rivalrous 
“determine[s] whether, and in what manner, it is subject to theft.” Id. 
13  Green’s study sampled opinions from 172 incoming students at Rutgers School of Law-
Newark to determine whether their “moral intuitions about the blameworthiness of different 
forms of theft are consistent with the way in which such offenses are treated under a 
consolidated theft regime.” Id. at 55, 57. In the second part of the study, Green asked students 
to compare four different scenarios. The scenarios involved the theft of a $50 test preparation 
tool in forms ranging from a physical test-preparation book, a downloaded electronic file, a 
seat in a test preparation lecture for which the lecture hall had empty seats, and a seat in a 
test-preparation lecture for which the lecture hall had no empty seats. Id. at 66. Fifty-six 
percent of participants said that stealing a physical book was more  blameworthy than stealing 
an electronic copy; forty-one percent said there was no difference between the two. Id. at 67. 
S ixty-seven percent of students reported stealing a physical book as more blameworthy than 
stealing a seat in a filled lecture hall, while twenty-two percent viewed no difference between 
the two. Id. Stealing a seat in a filled lecture hall was viewed worse than stealing a seat in a 
partially filled hall and in the final scenario, students ranked stealing an electronic book as 
more blameworthy than stealing a seat in a partially filled lecture hall. Id.  
14  See GREEN, supra  note 1, at 270-75. 
15  See id. at 270-76. 
16  Id. at 34 (“There is no easy explanation for why such specialization occurred more or less 
simultaneously with consolidation.”). 
17  See id. at 33-36 (citing the example of Louisiana and that state’s overabundance of 
specialized theft laws). 
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derive principally from a concern that specialized theft statutes are 
products of political expediency, or perhaps unconscious recognition of 
what has been lost in the process of consolidation, and therefore could do 
more harm than good by perpetuating the moral muddle created by 
consolidation while also needlessly cluttering up our criminal codes.18 
Although these are weighty concerns, we think that they may be 
misplaced, particularly with respect to contemporary laws meant to 
confront modern forms of theft, like unauthorized downloading, and laws 
that serve to highlight underappreciated norms internal to important social 
enterprises, such as retail commerce.19  In the remainder of this essay, we 
will therefore attempt to make a case for specialized theft statutes as a 
complement to Professor Green’s broader project. 
I. Specialized Theft Statutes 
Pennsylvania,20 New Jersey,21 and Colorado22 are just three states of 
 
18  See id. at 34-36. 
19  See, e.g., David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the La w that Saved the Web, 
WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008, 3:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/ten-years-later/ 
(explaining how the specially crafted Digital Millennium Copyright Act provided a successful 
remedy to an outdated copyright law and ultimately spurred the creation of new 
technological businesses). 
20  The theft consolidation provision of Pennsylvania’s theft chapter provides , in part, 
“[c]onduct denominated theft in this chapter constitutes a single offense. An accusation of 
theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft 
under this chapter, notwithstanding the specification of a different manner in the complaint or 
indictment . . . .” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3902 (West 1983). The sub-chapter enumerates 
various types of theft, including: theft by unlawful taking or disposition, theft by deception, 
theft by extortion, theft of property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake, receiving stolen 
property, and theft of services. See §§ 3921-3925.  
21  New Jersey’s theft consolidation provision provides  the following: 
Conduct denominated theft or computer criminal activity in this chapter 
constitutes a single offense, but each episode or transaction may be the 
subject of a separate prosecution and conviction. A charge of theft or 
computer criminal activity may be supported by evidence that it was 
committed in any manner that would be theft or computer criminal 
activity under this chapter . . . . 
 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-2 (West 2013). 
22  Colorado’s theft consolidation statute provides  the following: 
If any law of this state refers to or mentions larceny, stealing, 
embezzlement (except embezzlement of public  moneys), false pretenses, 
confidence games, or shoplifting, that law shall be interpreted as if the 
word ‘theft’ were substituted therefor; and in the enactment of sections 
18-4-401 to 18-4-403 it is the intent of the general assembly to define one 
crime of theft and to incorporate therein such crimes, thereby removing 
861 GRAY.FINAL  OR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)  11/13/2013   1:50 PM 
2013 In  Def e nse  o f  Spe cia liz ed  T he f t  St at ut es  865 
many that have consolidated various common law theft offenses into 
unitary theft provisions.23 Yet, despite the relative shrinking of their theft 
chapters to reflect consolidation, these states maintain an array of specialty 
statutes that target specific conduct likely covered already under the broad 
umbrella of their consolidated theft statutes. For example, in Pennsylvania, 
it is a crime to operate an organized retail scheme whereby stolen 
merchandise is later converted to money for criminal enterprises.24 In New 
Jersey, unlawfully accessing a computer database to defraud a third party 
could carry a sentence of up to ten years ’ imprisonment.25 In Colorado, 
leaving a gas station after dispensing fuel and failing to pay is outlawed by 
a state fuel-piracy provision.26 In Green’s view, these kinds of specialized 
theft laws are hard to justify from a normative point of view because they 
seldom mark any significant differences in blameworthiness or raise 
particular problems of proof or detection.27 Rather, all they do is satisfy 
short-term political impulses while contributing to a broader trend of 
cluttered and overly complicated criminal codes.28 
We think these concerns may have less bite on specialized theft laws 
than it might seem. In fact, we think that these and similar specialized theft 
statutes play an important expressive function and also serve to highlight 
norms and expectations that are uniquely important to the functioning of 
discrete social enterprises like retail sales and digital commerce. For these 
reasons, we conclude that these specialized statutes are not only 
appropriate, but also conform to the principled framework for theft laws 
that Professor Green develops in Thirteen Ways. 
 
distinctions and technicalities which previously existed in the pleading 
and proof of such crimes. 
 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-403 (2013); see a lso People v. Warner, 801 P.2 1187, 1189 (Colo. 1990) (en 
banc) (noting that the Colorado Legislature merged the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, false 
pretenses, and confidence games into a single general theft provision).  
23  According to Green, “[e]ighteen states have effected a ‘complete consolidation’ of theft 
law, meaning that all of the traditional species of theft (larceny, embezzlement, false 
pretenses, extortion, receiving stolen property, and unauthorized use) have been consolidated 
into a single offense of theft.” GREEN, supra note 1, at 27. Another twenty states have partially 
consolidated their theft laws. Id. 
24  See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3929.3(a), (c). 
25  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-25. 
26  See COLO. REV. S TAT. § 18-4-418. 
27  GREEN, supra note 1, at 35. The criteria for evaluating the merits of specialized theft 
statutes that we describe below are meant to complement rather than replace Green’s criteria.  
28  Id. at 165-66 (describing shoplifting statutes as “narrower than ordinary larceny”); id. at 
236-40 (discussing theft of intangible information not protected by intellectual property laws); 
id. at 89 (discussing fine distinctions between some forms of theft, such as fuel piracy, and 
breach of contract).  
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Many of the concerns that led Professor Green to take on an 
investigation of theft in the twenty-first century were part of public 
conversations that took place after the death of Internet activist and social 
entrepreneur Aaron Swartz.29 Swartz was accused of using an open 
network on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ’s (“MIT”) campus to 
download over four million academic articles from the online repository 
JSTOR.30 According to the amended indictment filed in his case, Swartz 
accomplished this task by using a software tool that allowed him to 
download articles at a rate far faster than would be possible if he simply 
pointed and clicked.31 He also used several masking techniques that 
disguised his identity and the identity of his computer to circumvent 
security measures, deployed by MIT and JSTOR, that were designed to 
detect and stop him from downloading that many articles in that  short a 
period of time.32 After he was apprehended, Swartz returned all of the files 
he downloaded back to JSTOR, which at that point declined to pursue any 
legal action.33 Carmen Ortiz, the U.S. Attorney for the District of 
Massachusetts, was not as understanding. Amidst much controversy,34 she 
secured an indictment against Swartz alleging multiple counts of wire and 
computer fraud.35 If convicted, Swartz faced a potential sentence of thirty-
 
29  Swartz was known as a “[w]eb entrepreneur and political activist.” Evan Allen, Web 
Activist  Swartz Takes Own Life, Bos. Globe (Jan. 12, 2013), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/01/12/web-activist-aaron-swartz-charged-with-
hacking-mit-dies-age/nbl1jOCxqQIFGdDANdYmxH/story.html At the age of fourteen, he 
helped develop Really Simple Syndicatio n (“RSS”), a website aggregation tool. Id. He also 
founded the grassroots political action group Demand Progress and co -founded the online 
news website, Reddit. Id. On January 11, 2013, Swartz committed suicide. Id. He was twenty-
six years old. Id.  
30  JSTOR is a not-for-profit corporation that collects, stores, and makes available academic 
articles from a range of scholarly journals. To cover the costs of digitizing the articles, 
expenses associated with maintaining the servers and bandwidth; to pay royalty fees to the 
holders of active copyrights, JSTOR collects fees from subscriber institutions like MIT, which 
in turn offer access to their clients and directly to individuals who are not affiliate d with a 
subscriber institution. Superseding Indictment at 1-3, United States v. Swartz, No. 1:11-CR-
10260-NMG (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2012), dismissed on Jan. 14, 2013, available at 
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/09/swartzsuperseding.pdf [hereinafter 
Superseding Indictment].  
31  Id. at 4-5. 
32  Id. at 5-7. 
33  See Aaron Swartz, JSTOR (Jan. 12, 2013), http://about.jstor.org/statement-swartz. 
34  See Emily Bazelon, When the Law is Worse Than the Crime: Why Was a Prosecutor Allowed to 
Intimidate Aaron Swartz for So Long?, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2013, 3:59 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/01/aaron_swartz_suicide_prosecut
ors_have_too_much_power_to_charge_and_intimidate.html. 
35  The charges in the superseding indictment include the following: two counts of wire 
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five years’ imprisonment and one million dollars in fines.36 
Swartz’s indictment met with considerable criticism from a number of 
corners on grounds that the law was being stretched to cover conduct that 
was not truly theft or fraud, and at any rate did not warrant the degree of 
punishment sought by the government.37 In response, U.S. Attorney Ortiz 
infamously declared that “‘[s]tealing is stealing whether you use a 
computer command or a crowbar, and whether you take documents, data, 
or dollars. It is equally harmful to the victim whether you sell what you 
have stolen or give it away.’”38 Professor Green’s work in Thirteen Ways 
rightly gives lie to this claim. 
First, Green shows exhaustively and persuasively why the manner by 
which a theft is accomplished matters quite a lot , regardless of one’s theory 
of criminal punishment, because different methods of accomplishing a 
theft threaten or accomplish different secondary harms.39 Reasonable 
people might disagree on the cardinal ordering of a theft accomplished by 
exploiting loopholes in an open computer network and prying open a 
locked door to effect a forcible entry into a home, but it is simply obtuse to 
claim that there is no difference between the two. 
Second, Professor Green explains why it is critical to account for 
different kinds of property when assessing the moral blameworthiness of a 
theft. Again, without begging the question of which is worse, stealing data 
as Swartz did is not the same as stealing money at least because Swartz left 
 
fraud pursuant to 18 U.S .C. §§ 1343 & 2, five counts of computer fraud pursuant to 18 U.S .C. 
§§ 1030(a)(4), (b) & 2, five counts of unlawfully obtaining information from a protected 
computer pursuant to 18 U.S .C. §§ 1030(a)(2), (b), (c)(2)(B)(iii) & 2, and one count of recklessly 
damaging a protected computer pursuant to 18 U.S .C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(B), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I), (VI) & 2. 
The indictment also includes forfeiture allegations pursuant to 18 U.S .C. § 981(a)(1)(C), 28 
U.S .C. § 2461(c), 18 U.S .C. § 982(a)(2)(B), and 18 U.S .C. § 1030(i). Superseding Indictment, 
supra  note 30, at 1, 10-16.  
36  John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a  Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a  Suicide, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2013, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaron-
swartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Press Release, United States 
Attorney’s Office Dist. of Mass., Alleged Hacker Charged with Stealing Over Four Million 
Documents from MIT Network (July 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2011/July/SwartzAaronPR.html.  
37  For criticism of the case against Swartz after his death see, for example, Michael Phillips, 
The Terrible Logic Behind the Government’s Case Against Aaron Swartz, BUZZFEED FWD (Jan. 14, 
2013, 6:27 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/mtpiii/the-terrible-logic-behind-the-governments-
case-ag; Tim Wu, How the Legal System Failed Aaron Swartz—and Us, NEW YORKER (Jan. 14, 
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/everyone-interesting-is-a-
felon.html?currentPage=all. 
38  John Schwartz, Open-Access Advocate is Arrested for Huge Download , N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
2011, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/us/20compute.html.  
39  GREEN, supra note 1, at 115–31. 
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JSTOR in full possession of its data, whereas stealing money is very  much a 
zero-sum game.40 
Third, Green shows that what a thief plans to do with the property he 
or she has stolen matters because those plans may affect an owner ’s 
property interests differently.41 For example, the value of JSTOR’s academic 
repository would have been harmed very little, if at all, had Swartz simply 
held on to the files he had taken. By contrast, the value of JSTOR ’s property 
interests would have been profoundly and permanently harmed if Swartz 
had set up a competing website that gave the articles away for free.42 
By taking account of the moral differences between a data theft 
accomplished by computer—where the thief does not plan to publish or 
otherwise release what he has taken—on the one hand, and a theft 
perpetrated by breaking a locked door with a crowbar to steal money that 
is subsequently spent and therefore unrecoverable, on the other hand, we 
do not mean to suggest that Swartz did not do anything wrong,43 or even 
criminal.44 Rather, the point we take from Professor Green’s work is that 
understanding exactly what the wrong is, and how it should be addressed, 
requires thoughtful precision. Consolidated theft statutes and U.S. 
Attorney Ortiz’s defense of her indictment fail to persuade because they 
indulge in hammy platitudes and uncritical analogy. By contrast, we see 
significant potential in specialized theft statutes to accomplish precisely the 
conceptual and normative precision that Professor Green rightly demands 
of our criminal laws. 
In our view, specialized theft statutes have a unique and important role 
in the general project that Professor Green advances in Thirteen Ways. Both 
at the frontiers of twenty-first century theft, and in cases closer to the 
traditional core of theft law, specialized theft statutes highlight the unique 
moral, political, and social conditions of the property regimes that are 
affected by acts of theft. In the subsequent sections of this essay  we 
 
40  See id. at 203-04. 
41  Id. at 75-76, 273. 
42  JSTOR clearly recognized as much when it declined to pursue legal action against 
Swartz after securing both a return of the stolen files and a reliable representation from 
Swartz that he did not intend to distribute the articles he downloaded. See Aaron Swartz, 
JSTOR (Jan. 12, 2013), http://about.jstor.org/statement-swartz. 
43  In fact, one of Mr. Swartz’s most sympathetic  supporters, Harvard Professor Lawrence 
Lessig, publicly disagreed with Mr. Swartz’s conduct. Mike Wendy, Larry Lessig Responds—
Says Swartz’s Alleged Actions Crossed Ethical Line, MEDIA FREEDOM (July 20, 2011), 
http://mediafreedom.org/2011/07/larry-lessig-responds-says-swartzs-alleged-actions-crossed-
ethical-line/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
44  As we argue below, our enterprise account of theft makes it very hard to see how 
Swartz’s conduct could be “criminal” without showing how his conduct fundamentally 
undermined a socially significant property regime.  
861 GRAY.FINAL  OR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)  11/13/2013   1:50 PM 
2013 In  Def e nse  o f  Spe cia liz ed  T he f t  St at ut es  869 
highlight two particularly important functions of specialized theft statutes: 
First, specialized theft statutes serve an important expressive and educative 
function in cases where common intuitions frequently fail to recognize or 
give sufficient weight to legitimate property interests affected by a theft. 
Second, even where those interests may be patent, specialized theft statutes 
defend unique property norms that are internal to particular social, 
political, or economic enterprise. 
II. Specialized Theft Laws Play an Important Expressive and 
Educative Function. 
The public debate about the prosecution of Aaron Swartz focused on 
two main concerns. The first was that prosecutors engaged in excessive 
charging, and as a consequence put Mr. Swartz at risk of punishment far 
greater than his conduct deserved.45 Some, in fact, argued that his conduct, 
although perhaps unethical or even minimally criminal, was so minor that 
the better course for the prosecutor would have been not to charge him at 
all.46 The second was that his conduct itself was not theft because the 
documents he liberated from JSTOR’s servers should be openly available.47 
We think that specialized theft laws play an important role in advancing 
both of these conversations by providing a forum and tool for education 
and expression. This is a particularly important service with respect to 
many twenty-first century theft crimes, like unauthorized downloading, 
which many people would reflexively not regard as criminal  or even 
particularly immoral. In the context of more fundamental debates about 
the nature of theft itself, specialized theft laws, and particularly the process 
of public debate surrounding their passage or defeat, also provide a unique 
forum for exploring and marking the boundaries of property in the twenty-
first century. We explore both of these points below. 
The empirical study prominently featured in Thirteen Ways inspires our 
view that theft laws play important expressive and educative functions. As 
part of an effort to assess common intuitions regarding the relative moral 
wrong that accompanies thefts accomplished by different means and 
 
45  See David Friedman, Overcharging: The Aaron Swartz Case, IDEAS (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/2013/01/overcharging-aaron-swartz-case.html. 
46  Reason Foundation, Aaron Swartz Was Driven to Suicide by a  Broken System , OPPOSING 
V IEWS (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.opposingviews.com/i/politics/aaron-swartz-punishment-
did-not-fit-crime. In this argument, Mr. Swartz’s allies appear to have a friend in Professor 
Green. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 161-65 (arguing that de minimis theft offenses should be 
effectively decriminalized). 
47  Mr. Swartz himself was a prominent member of the “open source” movement, and 
issued a manifesto calling others to join him in an effort to copy and make available on the 
Internet the contents of libraries. Aaron Swartz, Guerilla  Open Access Manifesto, ARCHIVE, 
http://archive.org/details/GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).  
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targeting different kinds of property, Professor Green surveyed 172 
incoming Rutgers University-Newark law students.48 These subjects were 
asked to evaluate two sets of stories related to theft offenses. The first set 
involved a series of twelve scenarios concerning the theft of a $350 bicycle 
accomplished by different means, including armed robbery, simple 
robbery, extortion, blackmail, theft by housebreaking, larceny, 
embezzlement, looting, false pretenses, passing a bad check, failing to 
return lost or misdelivered property, and receiving stolen property.49 
Subjects were asked to rank the scenarios in order of blameworthiness and 
to assign a sentence. The second set of stories was designed to measure 
intuitions regarding the relative blameworthiness of stealing different 
kinds of property.50 Here, Green’s subjects were asked to assess the relative 
seriousness of taking four different goods, each of which was valued at $50: 
a physical test-preparation book, a downloaded electronic file, a seat in a 
test-preparation lecture where the auditorium had empty seats, and a seat 
in a test-preparation lecture where the auditorium had no empty seats.51  
The results of the first part of Green’s study were not surprising and 
confirm his moral critique of consolidated theft statutes. With a few 
outliers, participants consistently ranked armed robbery as the most 
blameworthy, followed by extortion.52 At the other end of the spectrum, 
participants consistently ranked receiving stolen goods and failing to 
return misdelivered property as the least blameworthy methods by which 
to accomplish a theft.53 Sentencing recommendations confirmed these 
rankings. Students sentenced armed robbery most harshly, followed by 
extortion.54 Receiving stolen property and failing to return misdelivered 
property were given the lightest sentences.55 
Particularly given the current controversy over illegal downloading 
and digital pirating evident in the public debate about the prosecution of 
Aaron Swartz, the results of the second part of Professor Green’s study are 
both surprising and informative. Although 56% of participants said that 
stealing a physical book was more blameworthy than stealing an electronic 
copy, 3% said that stealing the electronic book was worse and 41% said that 
there was no difference between the two.56 This result is surprising to us. 
 
48  GREEN, supra note 1, at 54, 57.  
49  These, of course, are Green’s titular “thirteen ways” to accomplish a theft. Id. at 57-60. 
50  Id. at 58. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. at 60-61. 
53  Id. at 61. 
54  GREEN, supra note 1, at 61-62. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. at 67. 
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Particularly given the casual attitude that many people seem to have 
toward downloading songs and movies from the Internet,57 buying pirated 
movies and music from subway vendors,58 or copying software from their 
friends,59 we would have expected a vast majority of respondents in 
Professor Green’s study to report that downloading the electronic book 
was less blameworthy than stealing a physical book.60 Although relevant 
comparative empirical evidence is sparse, we suspect that the results of 
Green’s study reflect the educative and expressive success of civil 
litigation, criminal prosecutions, and efforts to pass specialized statutes  
targeting the theft of digital property. 
Unfortunately, we do not have the benefit of a prior study similar to 
the one conducted by Professor Green from which we can establish a  
baseline of comparison. Nevertheless, his research and ours indicate that 
the predominat view of unlawful downloading in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries was that it was either not theft, or was 
substantially less serious than theft of physical objects. Dowling v. United 
States, decided by the Supreme Court in 1985, provides a useful starting 
point.61 The appellant in that case, Paul Edmond Dowling, was convicted of 
violating § 2314 of the National Stolen Property Act (“NSPA”) after 
shipping thousands of bootleg Elvis Presley records across the country.62 
Section 2314 prohibited the interstate transport of “goods, wares, 
merchandise, securities or money of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing 
the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud.”63 The question 
before the Court was whether a “bootleg” record that included 
unauthorized copyright-protected musical performances could be 
considered merchandise “stolen, converted or taken by fraud” pursuant to 
 
57  Cf. Matthew Mirapaul, Is it Theft, or is it Freedom? 7 Views of the Web’s Impact on Culture 
Clashes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2000, at H42, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/20/business/entertainment-it-theft-it-freedom-7-views-web-
s-impact-culture-clashes.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.  
58  See David Mills, Video Pirates’ New Movie Booty; Camcorders Tape Screen Hits, WASH. POST, 
May 1, 1991, at B1. 
59  See John Markoff, Though Illegal, Copied Software is Now Common, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 
1992, at A1. 
60  Green reports some of the evidence of these attitudes in Thirteen Ways, including 
industry claims “that between 50 and 90 percent of all computer software used is 
unauthorized,” that “2.6 billion infringing music files are downloaded every month,” and that 
“[c]opyright infringement alone is estimated to cost about $58 billion and 373,000 jobs a year.” 
GREEN, supra note 1, at 249. 
61  473 U.S . 207 (1985). Green also discusses Dowling. See GREEN, supra note 1, at 254. 
62  Dowling, 473 U.S . at 208-09. 
63  Id. at 208 (quoting 18 U.S .C. § 2314 (1982)). 
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the NSPA.64 For his own part, Dowling argued that the statute prohibited 
only the taking of physical property and did not reach copyright.65 
Although he admitted that stealing, say, a crate of records packaged for 
retail sale would constitute theft on this standard, Dowling pointed out 
that he manufactured or otherwise lawfully acquired all of his physical 
goods. What he was accused of “stealing” was not physical property, then, 
but the recorded contents, which remained in the possession of their 
owners.66 Absent interference with title or a possessory interest, Dowling 
maintained, there could be no “theft.”67 Without disputing the fact that 
common law theft usually entailed some interference with title or 
possession, the government argued that unauthorized use of the musical 
compositions amounted to theft, conversion, or fraud.68 
Expressing views that surely were predominat in 1985, the Court 
agreed with Dowling, reasoning that the statute was, in essence, an 
instantiation of common law theft, and therefore required a component of 
physical interference that copyright infringement lacks.69 Drawing on that 
common law sensibility, the Court marked a distinction between the rights 
protected in copyright and “the possessory interest of the owner of simple 
‘goods, wares [or] merchandise.’”70 Unlike the holder of “ordinary chattel,” 
the Court wrote, “[a] copyright, like other intellectual property, comprises 
a series of carefully defined and carefully delimited interests to which the 
law affords correspondingly exact protections.”71 The Court reasoned that 
the language of the statute did not reach the taking that occurs when an 
infringer violates the rights of a copyright owner because “he does not 
assume physical control over the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its 
owner of its use.”72 “While one may colloquially link infringement with 
some general notion of wrongful appropriation,” the Court concluded, 
“infringement plainly implicates a more complex set of property interests 
than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud.”73 Based in part upon 
this reasoning, the Court held that the contents of bootleg records are not 
goods “stolen, converted or taken by fraud” within the meaning of the 
 
64  Id. at 216 (quoting 18 U.S .C. § 2314). 
65  See id. at 214. 
66  See id. at 216. 
67  See id. 
68  See Dowling, 473 U.S . at 214-15. 
69  See id. at 217-18. 
70  See id. at 217 (quoting 18 U.S .C. § 2314). 
71  Id. at 216. 
72  Id. at 217. 
73  Id. at 217-18. 
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Act.74 
During the mid-1990s, as the Internet expanded, so too did concerns 
about its potential to “virtually negate[]”75 property rights in copyrighted 
materials by facilitating the illegal copying and distribution of protected 
materials.76 Take, for example, the emergence of electronic “bulletin-
boards,” which early on confounded the entertainment industry.77 These 
boards were file-sharing systems that allowed users to link computers 
through phone lines to send and receive files and programs, often in 
violation of copyright protections.78 One contemporary news article 
described the quandary companies faced in determining the exact nature of 
the “wrong” committed when copyrighted files are traded over the 
Internet and who to hold liable for the infringement: “When someone 
downloads a snippet of music from a network like CompuServe Inc., can 
the on-line service be held liable? When someone transmits a wor k, are 
they ‘copying’ it in the legal sense of the word or merely ‘displaying’ it?”79 
Although these questions were in the air, popular public views continued 
to reflect the Court’s holding in Dowling, and therefore regarded 
downloading copyrighted materials through bulletin boards or other 
forums as something less than stealing.80 That began to change with the 
coordinated legal attack on Napster. 
In 1999, eighteen-year-old Shawn Fanning launched a pioneering file-
sharing program called Napster.81 This “peer-to-peer” network allowed 
users to directly exchange digital audio files.82 Once a Napster subscriber 
signed onto the program’s network, Napster servers searched his or her 
 
74  Dowling, 473 U.S . at 228. 
75  GREEN, supra note 1, at 256. 
76  See, e.g., Kenneth D. Suzan, Tapping to the Beat of a  Digital Drummer: Fine Tuning U.S. 
Copyright Law for Music Distribution on the Internet, 59 ALB. L. REV. 789, 789-80 (1996); Peter H. 
Lewis, 160 Nations Meet to Weigh Revision of Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/02/business/160-nations-meet-to-weigh-revision-of-
copyright-law.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Peter N. Spotts, Copyright Laws Play Catch-Up in 
Digital Age: Goal is to Stop the Duplication of Protected Material, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 27, 
1995, at 9, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0127/27091.html. 
77  See Junda Woo, Legal Beat: Copyright Law is Easy to Break on the Internet, Hard to Enforce, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1994, at B6. 
78  See Junda Woo, Copyright Laws Enter the Fight Against Electronic Bulletin Board , WALL. S T. 
J., Sept. 27, 1994, at B11. 
79  Woo, supra  note 77. 
80  See GREEN, supra note 1, at 249. 
81  See Karl Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME (Oct. 2, 2000), 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2053826,00.html.  
82  Id.  
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computer for music files.83 These file names were then uploaded to the 
Napster server where other users could search the index for a particular 
song or artist.84 If the search returned results, users simply selected the file 
they wished to download, and the Napster servers connected the host-user 
with the querying-user to facilitate a direct download of the selected file.85 
Eighteen months after its launch, Napster had thirty -eight million 
registered users.86 It was precisely that success that would prove fatal to 
Napster’s future. 
In December 1999, eighteen record companies, all members of the 
Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), sued Napster in the 
Northern District of California for copyright infringement and unfair 
competition.87 Just one month later, a group of music publishers filed a 
similar suit.88 All plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions barring Napster 
from engaging in “copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or 
distributing copyrighted music without the express permission of the 
rights owner.”89 The district court rejected Napster ’s affirmative defenses, 
including fair use and misuse of copyright, and granted the plaintiffs ’ 
preliminary injunction.90 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the district court ’s grant of the 
injunction, requiring Napster to remove any user file from its index if 
Napster had reasonable knowledge that the file contained copyrighted 
material.91 The terms of the injunction proved to be too much for the 
company to bear. Although Napster barred its users from sharing many 
copyrighted files, it was simply unable to prevent all copyright -infringing 
downloads through its service. Faced with this evidence of continued 
noncompliance, the district court issued a shutdown order in July 2001.92 In 
 
83  A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2000) aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
84  Id.  
85  Id.  
86  Amy Harmon, Napster Users Mourn End of Free Music , N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at C1. 
87  See A & M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 900; RIAA Members, RIAA, 
http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php?content_selector=aboutus_members&f=# (last visited Sept. 
16, 2013) (showing an updated list of RIAA members). 
88  A & M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 900. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 912, 923, 927.  
91  A & M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1027. The Ninth Circuit modified the injunction slightly 
to only impose contributory liability to the extent that Napster “(1) receives reasonable 
knowledge of specific  infringing files with copyrighted musical compositions and sound 
recordings; (2) knows or should know that such files are available on the Napster system; and 
(3) fails to act to prevent viral distribution of the works.” Id. 
92  See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002); Sam 
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June 2002, Napster filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.93 
Following the demise of Napster, the RIAA launched a major litigation 
program against illegal file-sharing more generally. The RIAA targeted 
individual file-sharers on peer-to-peer networks on college campuses by 
writing letters to the institutions whose networks were being used to 
facilitate their activities.94 These “pre-litigation letters” were then passed to 
the copyright-infringing students who were given two options: settle with 
the RIAA or face a lawsuit.95 Many settled, but not all. For example, 
Jammie Thomas went to trial after the RIAA issued to her a cease-and-
desist letter for her file-sharing activity.96 She lost at trial, and eventually 
was ordered to pay $222,000 in damages by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.97 
The fight against digital piracy was not just waged in the courts. In the 
late 1990s, Congress passed the No Electronic Theft Act (“NET Act”) and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).98 Both laws 
strengthened protections for copyrighted works. For example, the NET Act 
targeted copyright infringers who were not motivated by financial gain by 
including in the definition of “private financial gain” the “receipt, or 
expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other 
copyrighted works.”99 The DMCA also included an anti-circumvention rule 
that prohibited individuals from tampering with a technological measure 
that controls access to a copyrighted work, such as decrypting an 
encrypted device.100 
 
Costello, Court Orders Napster to Stay Shut, PCWORLD (Mar. 25, 2002, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/91144/article.html. 
93  Benny Evangelista, Napster Files for Bankruptcy, S.F. CHRON., June 4, 2002, at B1, available 
at http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Napster-files-for-bankruptcy-2813933.php. 
94  Emily Banks, Record Industry's Threats Seem to Reduce Illegal File Sharing: An Aggressive 
Campaign of Writing Letters to College Officia ls and Threatening to Sue Students Seems to Be Making 
a  Dent in Illegal Downloads, STAR TRIB., Mar. 3, 2008, at 3B, available at 
http://www.startribune.com/local/16167797.html?refer=y. 
95  Id. 
96  See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2012);  Greg 
Sandoval, Appeals Court Sides with RIAA, Jammie Thomas Owes $222,000 , CNET (Sept. 11, 2012, 
9:25 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57510453-93/appeals-court-sides-with-riaa-
jammie-thomas-owes-$222000/.  
97  Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d at 910. 
98  No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678; Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860. 
99  Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in A Digital Age: The Ongoing Conflict Between 
Copyright Law and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV. 195, 215-16 (2006). 
100  See 17 U.S .C. § 1201 (2006). The DMCA is also widely noted for limiting the liability of 
Internet service providers and hosting services for the intellectual property violations of their 
users. Kravets, supra  note 19. 
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Specialized statutes targeting digital piracy  continue to multiply. For 
example, in 2008, Congress passed the Prioritizing Resources and 
Organization for Intellectual Property Act (“PRO IP Act”), which enhanced 
criminal penalties for copyright infringement and established the Office of 
the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement Representative within 
the Executive Branch.101 That same year, Tennessee became the first state in 
the country to sign a bill into law that required state public and private 
educational institutions to adopt policies prohibiting the infringement of 
copyright-protected works over school networks.102 In 2011, Senator Patrick 
Leahy of Vermont introduced the Preventing Real Online Threats to 
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act, known as the 
PROTECT IP Act.103 The PROTECT IP Act would allow the Department of 
Justice to commence civil lawsuits against domain name registrants or the 
domain names directly.104 The PROTECT IP Act would further allow a 
court to issue a cease-and-desist order to the registrant, or its owner or 
operator, if the site is dedicated to infringing activities.105 
Alongside these legislative and prosecutorial efforts, law enforcement 
agencies and trade organizations, like the RIAA and the Motion Picture 
Association of America, have engaged in a sustained effort to shape public 
perceptions of unlawful downloading.106 Professor Green describes some of 
the highlights in Thirteen Ways, including a Justice Department website, 
which advises readers that “copying [software] from the Internet . . . is the 
same as stealing it from a store,” and a pervasive advertising campaign 
designed to draw parallels between stealing “a car . . . a handbag . . . a 
mobile phone . . . [or] a DVD” and downloading pirated films.107 
There can be little doubt that these efforts to target unlawful 
downloading have expressive value and educative effects. Before Napster’s 
downfall, downloading free, copyrighted music was widely accepted and 
widely practiced, apparently without risk.108 To the extent it was 
condemned, few appeared to regard it as a kind of theft on par with 
 
101  Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256. 
102  TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-7-142 (West 2009). 
103  PROTECT IP Act, S . 968, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS -112s968is/pdf/BILLS -112s968is.pdf.  
104  Id. § 3(a)(1). 
105  Id. § 3(b)(1). 
106  See Charles Lane, High Court to Weigh File Sharing; Industry Likens Practice to Theft, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2004, at E1; Editorial, The New York Times Stands Strongly Against Theft on 
the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2005, at A22. 
107  GREEN, supra note 1, at 247. 
108  See Erik Ahlberg, The Best Way to…Find Tunes—The Wide Range of Choices Online Will be 
Music to Your Ears, WALL S T. J., Nov. 27, 2000, at R22. 
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stealing a physical book. Today, however, as Green’s study reveals, a 
substantial proportion of people view unlawful downloading as just as bad 
as stealing physical goods.109 Some even think it is worse.110 There is very 
little reason to think that this shift would have occurred without concerted 
public education efforts, including the debate and passage of specialized 
theft statutes such as the DMCA and the PROTECT IP Act. 
The expressive and educative value of specialized theft statutes is not 
diminished when public debate leads to the defeat of a particular measure. 
Take, for example, Congress’s recent failure to pass the Stop Online Piracy 
Act (“SOPA”).111 Like the PROTECT IP Act, SOPA would have both 
expanded criminal liability for unauthorized streaming and downloading, 
and granted law enforcement broad power to seek injunctions against 
websites, search engines, and Internet service providers whose services 
facilitated illegal downloading.112 In part due to public resistance organized 
by Aaron Swartz and others associated with the open access movement, 
SOPA did not become law.113 Rather than undercutting our claim here—
that specialized theft statutes play an important expressive and educative 
function—the defeat of SOPA, and particularly the public debate about 
SOPA and its alternatives, such as the Online Protection and Enforcement 
of Digital Trade Act, proves our point.114 At the frontiers of twenty-first 
 
109  GREEN, supra note 1, at 67. 
110  Id. Three percent of respondents in Green’s empirical study viewed stealing an 
electronic book as more blameworthy than stealing a physical book. 
111  H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Matt Williams, Sopa and Pipa Votes Shelved After Congress 
Climbs Down on Piracy Bills, GUARDIAN (London) (Jan. 20, 2012, 11:44 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/20/pipa-vote-shelved-harry-reid.  
112  John Naughton, Q&A: Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), GUARDIAN (London) (Jan. 21, 
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/22/sopa-pipa-johhn-naughton. 
113  See Hayley Tsukayama, Alexis Ohanian, Reddit Co-Founder and Web Advocate, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 5, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/alexis -ohanian-
reddit-co-founder-and-web-advocate/2012/09/05/f642f1b6-eb9f-11e1-9ddc-
340d5efb1e9c_story.html; Caitlin Dewey, Aaron Swartz, Internet Activist and Innovator 




114  S . 2029, 112th Cong. (2011) / H.R. 3782, 112th Cong. (2012); see, e.g., Naughton, supra 
note 112 (demonstrating that the media thought it worthwhile to educate the public  about 
SOPA and that many expressed dissent). In 2011, Senators Amy Klobuchar, John Cornyn, and 
Chris Coons introduced another piece of legislation that would have made it easier for federal 
prosecutors to pursue websites that illegally stream copyright-protected works. The 
Commercial Felony Streaming Act provides for up to five years’ imprisonment for a website 
operator who transmits at least ten streams of copyright-protected public  performances 
provided that the retail value of the streams, or the total economic value of the streams to the 
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century theft, debates about specialized theft statutes draw otherwise 
unrecognized issues to the attention of civil society. The passage and 
failure of specialized theft statutes play an even more critical role by 
marking the contested boundaries and shaping our theories and 
conceptions of property going forward. 
In a 2012 New York Times editorial applying some of the views 
Professor Green advances in Thirteen Ways to a Department of Justice 
investigation of a file-sharing site, he notes that “[t]he criminal law also 
plays an important role in informing, shaping, and reinforcing societal 
norms.”115 He nevertheless reports the results of his study as showing that 
“lay observers draw a sharp moral distinction between file sharing and 
genuine theft, even when the value of the property is the same.”116 We see 
the available data differently. By comparing evidence of lay views from the 
early years of the Internet age to the results of Green ’s own empirical 
study, we see evidence of a marked shift in public intuitions toward 
regarding illegal downloading as a form of “cyber theft” that is on par with 
traditional larceny. Where few people regarded downloading as wrong, 
much less a form of criminal theft, during the heyday of Napster, Professor 
Green’s empirical work shows that a substantial portion of society now 
regards unauthorized downloading as at least on par with larceny of 
physical property.117  This shift can be attributed in significant part to 
specialized theft statutes, targeted prosecutions, and focused public 
interest messaging. Of course, that success may well be undesirable to the 
extent that it is founded on a conceptual or moral mistake.118 We turn to 
this question in the next section. 
III. Are Unlawful Downloading and Other Forms of Twenty-First 
Century Stealing “Theft”? 
Professor Green might concede that specialized theft statutes focusing 
on unlawful downloading and file sharing have been successful in shaping 
public views, but nevertheless object to them on normative or conceptual 
grounds. For example, he might contend that conduct like that alleged by 
the government in its prosecution of Aaron Swartz should not be 
 
infringer, exceeds $2,500. See S . 978, 112th Cong. (2011).  
115  S tuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Community Perceptions of Theft Seriousness: A 
Challenge to Model Penal Code and English Theft Act Consolidation, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
511, 516 (2010). 
116  S tuart P. Green, Op-Ed, When Stealing Isn’t Stealing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2012, at A27, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/opinion/theft-law-in-the-21st-century.html? 
pagewanted=all; see a lso GREEN, supra note 1, at 67-68. 
117  GREEN, supra note 1, at 67 tbl.3. 
118  See infra  Part IV. 
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criminalized at all. Alternatively, he might argue that, to the extent such 
conduct is or should be criminal, it is an error to categorize it as “theft.” 
Although many of Swartz’s most ardent defenders have argued that his 
conduct was not, or should not be regarded as, criminal, Professor Green 
remains largely agnostic on this point in Thirteen Ways, preferring instead 
to draw a conceptual line between “theft” and twenty-first century offenses 
like unauthorized downloading.119 In this section, we suggest some reasons 
why readers might not want to follow Professor Green down this road. 
One of Professor Green’s objections to specialized theft statutes is that 
they crowd criminal codes and sometimes make it confusing to figure out 
exactly what is and is not criminal.120 There is, therefore, a certain tension 
in his resistance against efforts to categorize illegal downloading as a form 
of theft in that adopting his views would require more specialized law in 
these areas. There is surely a happy median between elegance and 
conceptual precision, of course, so we do not regard this tension as 
anything more than practical. Those practicalities aside, we are far more 
interested in Professor Green’s arguments for drawing a conceptual 
distinction between “theft” crimes and what he regards as quite different 
sorts of twenty-first century offenses like unlawful downloading, often 
referred to as theft crimes. 
Although his argument is more nuanced than we can hope to capture 
in a few sentences, the essence of Professor Green’s position is that not all 
property can be stolen and only some interferences with property rights 
can accurately be categorized as “theft.” “Property,” Green writes, “is best 
thought of not as a physical thing but as the bundle of rights organized 
around the idea of securing, for the right of the holder , exclusive use or 
access to, or control of, a thing.”121 This definition is in broad accord with 
the Restatement, which uses “property” to “denote legal relations between 
persons with respect to a thing,” which may have a “physical existence or 
it may be any kind of an intangible such as a patent right or a chose in 
action.”122 Among the “legal relations” commonly associated with property 
are rights to possess, alter, exclude, consume, sell, encumber, rent, 
exchange, or destroy.123 Not all property is capable of underwriting all of 
these rights, of course. Moreover, each of these rights has a different 
character. As a consequence, some property is hard or impossible to sell 
because it cannot be readily commoditized.124 Other forms of property are 
 
119  See GREEN, supra note 1, at 246-52; Phillips, supra  note 37; Wu, supra  note 37. 
120  GREEN, supra note 1, at 36. 
121  Id. at 73. 
122  RESTATEMENT FIRST OF PROP. ch. 1, intro. note (1936). 
123  GREEN, supra note 1, at 74. 
124  Id. at 208. 
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highly elastic, which allows many people to possess or use the property 
without materially affecting the ability of others to do the same.125 It is 
these two features, commoditizability and exclusivity, that most concern 
Professor Green.126 
In Professor Green’s view, the only “kind of property that can be 
subject to theft reflects two basic requirements: first, it must be 
commodifiable, meaning that it is capable of being bought and sold; and, 
second, it must be rivalrous, meaning that consumption of it by one user 
will prevent simultaneous consumption by others.”127 In short, property 
that can be stolen has a certain “zero-sumness.”128 So, for example, we have 
a copy of Professor Green’s book. It is a commodity. We paid money for it, 
and can certainly sell it to someone else when we are through with it.129 
Once it is in possession of another, however, it is beyond our use. On this 
definition, Green points out, it is hard to make the case that intellectual 
property, particularly when reduced to digital files, is the sort of property 
that can be stolen. Take the example given to participants in Green ’s study 
of an electronic book. There is no doubt that a digitized book stored on a 
server is a commodity. The file itself can be bought or sold. It can also be 
rented by, for example, affording one user access to the contents for a 
limited period of time. In a more familiar contemporary model, the owner 
of the electronic book might also charge buyers a one-time fee that would 
allow them to copy the file for future perusal at their leisure. An electronic 
book, therefore, has one key feature of property that can be stolen: 
commoditizability.130 Where an electronic book begins to look unlike the 
kind of property that can be stolen on Green’s account is the feature that he 
describes as “zero-sumness.”131 
By its nature, an electronic file is endlessly elastic. Whether it is copied 
and downloaded once or a billion times, the file is not degraded and 
remains on the owner ’s server, ready for use at any time he or she likes. In 
this sense, any property interest that an owner might have in the content of 
an electronic file is not rivalrous.132 An electronic copy of a book can be 
 
125  Id. at 209-10. 
126  Id. at 74, 267-69. 
127  Id. at 74. 
128  Id. at 80. 
129  In assuming a robust market for Professor Green’s book, we deny with all seriousness 
his self-deprecating description of it as “an obscure book on the moral theory of theft law.” 
GREEN, supra  note 1, at 255. 
130  See Niva Elkin-Koren, The Changing Nature of Books and the Uneasy Case for Copyright, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1712, 1725-26 (2011) (discussing how ebooks could be published in fewer 
steps and with less cost than traditional publications).  
131  See GREEN, supra  note 1, at 80. 
132  Id. at 255-56. 
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copied and read by everyone or no one without affecting the ability of the 
owner to do the same because the owner still has “the work, even after the 
illegal downloads have occurred.”133 This does not mean that the rights of 
the book’s owner are not affected by illegal downloading, for they surely 
are.134 For example, the right to exclude is violated by unauthorized 
downloading, as is the right to rent or sell copies of his or her book. In fact, 
unauthorized downloading and distribution might mean that “the 
economic value of [the electronic book] has been virtually negat ed.”135 The 
owner may even have a right to remedy in trespass or tort. Unauthorized 
downloading is nevertheless not a theft in Green ’s view because it 
interferes with neither possession nor title, no matter the degree of 
interference with commercial value.136 
In keeping with our defense of specialized theft statutes, we think that 
Professor Green’s focus on commodification and rivalrousness, as two 
necessary features of property that can be stolen, is too narrow. In our 
view, “theft” should encompass any criminal interference with property 
rights, the respect for which is sufficiently central to a socially significant 
enterprise to make protecting those rights a legitimate matter of public 
interest. In making this proposal, we rely on a very parsimonious  view of 
criminality that we attribute to a certain brand of retributivism rooted in 
the work of Immanuel Kant.137 One of us has written at length elsewhere 
about Kant’s criminal theory and the constraints it puts on the scope of 
criminalization.138 We will not repeat that work here, but a few words are 
necessary to explain our disagreement with Professor Green and the 
alternative that disagreement recommends. 
Kant’s theory of punishment is linked to his moral theory, which in 
turn is built around the categorical imperative.139 In its most popular 
formulation, the categorical imperative requires simply that “I should 
never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law.”140 By “maxim,” Kant means “[a] rule that the 
 
133  Id.  
134  Id. at 254-57.  
135  Id. at 256. 
136  See id. at 78-80. 
137  See, e.g., David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1659-60 (2010) 
(discussing the central feature of Immanuel Kant’s moral theory).  
138  See id.; David Gray & Jonathan Huber, Retributivism for Progressives: A Response to 
Professor Flanders, 70 MD. L. REV. 141, 153-57 (2010). 
139  Gray, supra note 137, at 1660. 
140  IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 14 (James W. Ellington 
trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1993). 
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agent himself makes his principle [of action] on subjective grounds.”141 
Thus, the categorical imperative allows us to act upon principles of 
conduct that can be universalized without contradiction.142 Contrariwise, it 
forbids us to act on maxims that fail the test of logical purity in that they 
contain their own contradiction.143 For some crimes, like murder or suicide, 
the contradiction is inherent in the conduct. After all, proposing as 
universal law the maxim of murder would be to propose the extinction of 
rational beings.144 For other crimes, however, the contradiction is only to be 
found by reference to a norm or condition that is necessary to the social 
enterprise, which the conduct, as a crime, offends. Theft is one of these. 
Let us assume for the time being that the maxim of theft “is taking the 
property of another.”145 Theft is immoral in a society that recognizes the 
concept of ownership because the maxim “I take that which is not mine” 
cannot be universalized without contradicting the very concept of 
ownership upon which the maxim itself depends.146 We can, of course, 
imagine living in a society where property is held collectively rather than 
individually owned. In such a world, theft would have no meaning, and 
therefore would not be criminal.147 In our society, however, where 
possession and title in property play a central role in a wide range of social 
practices, engaging in conduct that offends rights of possession or title is a 
crime, which we call “theft.”148 
Until quite recently, the social practices that were both sufficiently 
close to our cultural core and required some respect for property rights 
could be adequately defended by limiting the scope of “theft” crimes to 
conduct that contradicted rights of possession and title. That is increasingly 
less true. As our social practices have diversified, expanded, and become 
more anonymous, so too have we come to depend on respect for norms 
that once were secondary, unworthy of note, or even incomprehensible to 
our common law forebears. As we see it, specialized theft statutes, and 
 
141  Id. at 17-18. An agent’s maxim of action is, by definition available, only to him but can 
be imputed to him based on his actions. Id. at 18-19.  
142  Id. at 18; Gray, supra note 137, at 1661-62. 
143  Gray, supra note 137, at 1662. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
147  Cf. id. (explaining that, because theft requires taking another’s property, it can be 
inferred that, if property is owned collectively there is no pro perty of another to be taken—
thus rendering “theft” a nullity and, accordingly, not criminal).  
148  Although they differ in the details, many retributivist theories follow this basic  outline. 
See, e.g., Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 31, 34-35 (1979); 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-57 (1971); 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF 
CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 230-31, 233 (2007). 
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contests around them, have a unique role to play in this changing world 
because they highlight these new social practices and public interests in 
defending their normative preconditions. Furthermore, contests over these 
specialized statutes afford an important opportunity to engage in civil 
society and political debates about not only the internal conditions of these 
emerging enterprises, but also whether they are sufficiently central to 
twenty-first century life to be worthy of defense by the criminal law.149 
By way of explanation, let us consider an example of a specialized theft 
statute that does not challenge Professor Green ’s definition of theft. 
Pennsylvania recently passed an organized r etail theft statute.150 The law 
works in tandem with Pennsylvania ’s retail theft and receiving-stolen-
property laws to prohibit the coordination, control, supervision, or 
management of an organized retail theft enterprise.151 Stolen merchandise 
with a retail value between $5,000 and $19,000 is graded as a third-degree 
felony and stolen merchandise with a retail value of more than $20,000 is 
considered a second-degree felony.152 Even under Professor Green’s 
definition of property that can rightly be the target of theft, retail goods 
qualify. They not only have a commercial value, but the shoplifter ’s 
possession of goods is directly adverse to the shopkeeper ’s. Green is 
nevertheless skeptical of specialized statutes such as this because they add 
nothing of moral significance over general prohibitions on theft and, 
therefore, add unnecessary clutter to the criminal law.153 We think this 
might be too fast. 
In 2010, organized retail crime resulted in losses estimated between 
fifteen and thirty billion dollars.154 The scale of those losses is in part due to 
the activities of organized shoplifting rings, which methodically steal 
merchandise from stores. As Representative Tom Caltigarone, who 
sponsored the Pennsylvania bill, pointed out, “[t]hese organizations, many 
of which operate across state lines, overwhelm retailers with large numbers 
 
149  This marks an important distinction between the criminal law, as a species of public  
law, and private law, including contract and tort. Although we do not accuse Professor Green 
of making this mistake, an excessive focus on the impact of a particular theft on the interests 
of an owner or possessor risks equivocating between the two. Kant avoids this trap by linking 
criminal prohibitions not to the impact of a particular act on a specific  victim, but the  
consequences for a social enterprise that would result if all participants engaged in the 
conduct marked as a “crime.” RAWLS, supra  note 148, at 251-57. 
150  Organized Retail Theft Act, 2010 Pa. Laws 212 (codified as amended at 18 PA. CONST. 
STAT. ANN. § 3929.3 (West 2012)). 
151  18 PA. CONST. S TAT. ANN. § 3929.3 (West 2012). 
152  Id. 
153  See GREEN, supra  note 1, at 34-36. 
154  Latest on Organized Retail Crime, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N, 
http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Dashboard&id=64 (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).  
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of shoplifters simultaneously.”155 “They may [also] target the same store 
more than once, knowing they can risk the arrest of one or some of the 
group members and still carry out the job.”156 The primary outlets for these 
stolen goods are grey market fence operators, who sell the illegally  
obtained goods through pawn shops, flea markets, and auction sites.157 
Some who purchase these goods know, or suspect, that they are stolen. In 
fact, many find a certain thrill in buying “hot” merchandise.158 As evidence 
of these attitudes, the respondents to Professor Green ’s questionnaire 
ranked receiving stolen property as the least serious form of theft.159 This 
signals to us a broad lack of appreciation for the impact that shoplifting 
and receiving stolen goods have on the key social enterprise of retail sales. 
Specialized theft statutes like this Pennsylvania law , therefore, serve an 
important expressive and educative function by highlighting both the 
importance of retail commerce in contemporary society and the impact of 
shoplifting and abetting shoplifting on that enterprise. For both the 
thoughtless and the ignorant among us, these statutes highlight our 
important roles in these property regimes and the norms of conduct these 
enterprises require in order to persist. 
Of course shoplifting is theft even on Green’s account. We are, after all, 
talking about goods that are r ivalrous commodities. But how does the 
enterprise approach we have sketched here help us to make sense of 
specialized theft statutes for twenty-first century crimes like New Jersey ’s 
prohibition on taking “data,” including information stored on removable 
disks and external disk drives?160 The answer is not found in the nature of 
computer systems or the endlessly scalable data that they trade in—which 
is the focus of Professor Green’s analysis—but in the networks of exchange 
that they intersect with, advance, enable, or create. Let us consider digital 
books. Some digital books exist for and intersect with social enterprises 
that require unrestricted copying, transmittal, and consumption. Take, for 
 
155  Press Release, Pa. House of Representatives, Governor S igns Caltagirone Organized 
Retail Theft Bill into Law (June 18, 2010) (on file with Pa. House of Representatives), available 
at http://www.pahouse.com/pr/127061810.asp. 
156  Id.  
157  NATIONAL RETAIL FEDERATION, 2012 ORGANIZED RETAIL CRIME SURVEY 6 (2012), available 
at http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=News&op=viewlive&sp_id=1380 (download 
complete survey).  
158  We are reminded here of an episode of the television show Seinfeld in which the main 
character, Jerry, told his father that an expensive gift purchased legitimately was bought for 
much less on the black market because Jerry believed that his father would both object less to 
the extravagance and find some thrill in the possibility of receiving stolen property. Seinfeld: 
The Wizard (NBC television broadcast Feb. 26, 1998). 
159  GREEN, supra note 1, at 60-61. 
160  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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example, open source websites for the distribution of academic work, like 
the Social Sciences Research Network (“SSRN”),161 or political 
organizations engaged in modern-day pamphleteering.162 For authors of 
books lodged on these kinds of websites, unlimited access is the point. Too 
many limitations on parties’ access or ability to download copies of their 
digital books would, to adopt a phrase from Professor Green, “virtually 
negate” the whole value of the enterprise. Consider , by way of contrast, the 
author of a novel made available for download through an online vendor 
like Amazon.163 Here, unlimited access and downloading “virtually 
negates” the Amazonian enterprise as a property regime. In both cases, the 
digital books in question retain their non-zero-sumness, but where one 
enterprise by definition exploits that characteristic the other must restrict it 
or cease to exist. In this developing and often confusing landscape of 
twenty-first century property regimes, specialized theft statutes play a 
crucial role by marking the line between distinct enterprises and by 
clarifying for those who participate in different regimes what conduct does 
and does not hold the potential to negate them. 
Adopting an enterprise account of theft law also helps to make sense of 
grading issues. Contrary to U.S. Attorney Ortiz’s claim in defense of her 
indictment of Aaron Swartz, thefts are not all the same. As Green and his 
study participants show, both the means and the nature of the property 
matter.164 If our enterprise account of theft is right , then there are other 
important variables that ought to be included in a moral analysis of theft 
severity, which also likely serve to underwrite common intuitions. In 
particular, the social importance of a property regime or a property -based 
enterprise and the centrality of the norm offended by criminal conduct 
should and do play important roles in grading theft offenses. Thus, 
unauthorized downloading is less serious than theft by housebreaking 
because intellectual property regimes are much less central to our society, 
our lives, and our senses of self than personal property regimes—at this 
stage at least.  We therefore ought to expect that theft by housebreaking 
will be punished more severely than unauthorized downloading of a 
digital book. Furthermore, an unauthorized dow nload for personal use is 
less offensive to intellectual property regimes and commercial online 
 
161  See SOC. S CI. RES. NETWORK, http://www.ssrn.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). 
162  See Donald J. Kochan, The Blogosphere and the New Pamphleteers, 11 NEXUS 99, 99-101 
(2006) (explaining how the blogosphere enables politically -minded individuals to introduce, 
distribute, and debate their political ideals through a vast medium).  
163  See generally Book Marketer, How Amazon Pricing Affects Author and Publisher Profits, 
PUBLETARIAT (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.publetariat.com/?p=942 (explaining that Amazon’s 
discount model does not affect author profits). 
164  GREEN, supra  note 1, at 4-5. 
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publishing enterprises than is competitive distribution. We should 
therefore expect that specialized theft statutes will reflect these differences 
as well.165 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing is, of course, a sketch at best. We nevertheless hope that 
we have succeeded in making at least a preliminary case for specialized 
theft statutes. Although we appreciate Professor Green ’s concerns that 
these laws can sometimes further clutter already complex criminal codes 
without marking any moral distinctions of real significance, these laws 
sometimes serve important educative and expressive purposes. They may 
be particularly valuable where the target crimes are twenty-first century 
thefts. Furthermore, the process of drafting, debating, and passing—or 
failing to pass—statutes governing these crimes is almost as critical as the 
laws themselves because these conversations provide critical forums for 
public discussion about the norms and practices that are essential to our 
evolving world of property regimes. The prosecution and tragic death of 
Aaron Swartz is such a moment, and demands our careful attention. 
Professor Green’s timely and important book has an important role to play 
in guiding these conversations, for which we all owe him our thanks. 
 
 
165  We therefore agree with some of Aaron Swartz’s defenders that his conduct was 
relatively innocuous so long as he did not intend to distribute the files he downloaded from 
JSTOR. See Alex Stamos, The Truth About Aaron Swartz’s “Crime,” UNHANDLED EXCEPTION (Jan. 
12, 2013), http://unhandled.com/2013/01/12/the-truth-about-aaron-swartzs-crime//#comment-
1313. 
